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Contact tracing has become both a buzzword and a priority during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Though it was deployed nationwide in the U.S., its success varied regionally. This special project 
thesis, in the form of a longform journalism article, traces the public health practice back to its 
roots to explore who contact tracers are, what they do, and what factors contributed to tracing’s 
limited success in 2020–21, centering around concepts of stigma and privacy. With this 
foundation, it assesses the promise and perils of incorporating technology into contact tracing 
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It may have come as a shock to you when the test came back positive. Maybe you had been at a 
dinner party where everyone had sworn they’d gotten tested just the other day. Or you decided to 
sneak in a workout before you picked up your child from daycare, and in your rush to the gym 
forgot to bring a mask. I’m standing far enough away from him, you thought to yourself as you 
eyed another maskless person. Maybe you were, maybe you weren’t. What matters now is that 
you’ve tested positive for COVID-19.1 
 
The next hour is a whirlwind of texts and calls. You cancel the walk with a friend you had 
planned, and let the group chat know the bad news. Then, you hunker down to isolate. If you get 
groceries and food delivered, you make sure they leave it at your doorstep, and you come out to 
claim it once they’ve left.  
 
You’re on FaceTime with your sister — You were being so safe! You’re literally the last person 
I’d think to get this — when you get a call from a number you don’t have saved. After a few 
rings you pick up, and the voice on the other line identifies themselves as a contact tracer. 
 
“Hi, this is Julie from the health department. I need to discuss some sensitive information with 
you.”2 
 
After confirming your name and birth date, Julie asks about when your symptoms started, or, if 
you haven’t experienced any, when you tested positive. Next, she asks if you’d be willing to 
work with her to list out everyone you were in close contact with up to two days before you 
started feeling sick. She tells you that you’re also free to call your contacts before her team 
reaches out to them.3 
 
You try to remember what you did in those two days before you first experienced symptoms. 
You can recall a dinner date at an indoor restaurant, a session with a personal trainer, and a night 
where a bunch of your friends met up to watch the game. But was that before or after your cough 
came on? Were you feeling feverish during the date, or could it just have been nerves? You feel 
yourself choke up, and Julie reassures you, saying, “I know it feels like everything is happening 
so fast.” 
 
You pull up your Google Calendar to double-check that you’ve correctly remembered every 
event and contact you listed. Finally, Julie tells you that your next steps are to isolate: stay home 
and try not to have contact with other people, unless you have to see a doctor. The interview lasts 
about an hour, although you’ve heard from friends that they can last anywhere from 30 minutes 
to a few hours.4,5 
 
Over the next few days, you might hear from your close contacts that someone had reached out 
to them as well. They might recall that the notifier said something along the lines of, “I am 
calling to let you know that you have been identified as someone who was exposed to a person 
diagnosed with COVID-19, also called coronavirus,” but wouldn’t name names. 
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Your brush with COVID-19 contact tracing isn’t unique; in fact, millions of stories that are 
nearly identical have played out in tandem over the course of the pandemic. As one of the three 
pillars of “test, trace, and isolate,” tracing is an immensely important public health tool. Tracing 
is a race against the virus, and against the clock. 
 
Tracing, of course, is only one piece of the puzzle. Effective and widespread testing is the 
backbone to any successful tracing effort, one which was notably absent for most of the U.S. 
response to the pandemic. But for the sake of this thesis, tracing will be considered in a relative 
vacuum. 
 
It’s crucial to understand where contact tracing came from and how tracing for smallpox and 
sexually transmitted infections shaped the structure of modern-day tracing, as well as the stigma 
that historically surrounded the targets and employees of the practice. Tracers played a unique 
role that required medical and emotional expertise, although the people who conducted tracing 
were only occasionally doctors. More frequently, they were nurses or other support staff. It’s 
also important to recognize the pressures that led to the effective dissolution of an American 
contact tracing force, which explains the growing pains associated with rapidly scaling up tracing 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Having established this background, we can assess the state of 
contact tracing during the COVID-19 pandemic more clearly, pointing out what went wrong, 
what we know, and what we don’t. It’s within this context that exposure notification apps arrived 
to “disrupt,” promising quicker turnarounds that would reach more people more efficiently than 
traditional tracing. These hopes, however, were stymied due to problems with the apps 
themselves and with their underlying premise: that traditional contact tracing could be replaced.  
 
1.1 A brief history of contact tracing 
 
The index case in the outbreak in the city of Chester was a symptomatic child. One day, while at 
a partially open-air gallery on Northgate Street, a daughter of the late Reverend Harwood passed 
very close to, but did not touch, this child.6 Eleven days later, she fell ill and started displaying 
the characteristic symptoms of disease: a flat, red rash starting in the mouth and throat. Next, a 
rash appeared on her skin, and the individual sores filled with a thick, opaque fluid and appeared 
dented in the center.7 
 
This was the late 18th century, and the disease was epidemic smallpox. We know about Rev. 
Harwood’s daughter because of the work of John Haygarth, the physician of Chester Infirmary 
and the doctor whom many consider to be the father of modern contact tracing.8 Haygarth 
undertook meticulous case counting, interviewing, and documenting of smallpox outbreaks in 
Chester, a novel approach spurred by an overwhelming desire to reduce the burden of disease in 
the city. 
 
“In the year 1774, the natural smallpox was so dreadfully fatal to the poor inhabitants of Chester, 
as to produce a deep impression upon my mind, especially when I considered, that it was 
possible to prevent such destruction,” he wrote in the introduction to a 1784 manual on smallpox 
prevention.6 “Ever since that time, it has been an object of my most anxious wishes to preserve 
their lives by inoculation.” 
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Haygarth later founded the Smallpox Society in Chester, and he devoted his career to fighting 
smallpox with the passion of a fanatic. He proposed in his manual the establishment of a team of 
500 “inspectors” — analogous to tracers — one per health district in England, managed by a 
board of 50 physicians.9  
 
This hypothetical contact tracing force bore a striking resemblance to that of the Roman legions 
— and one that may not have been coincidental. Haygarth began his manual with a partial verse 
from the Georgics, a didactic poem by the Roman poet Virgil. The epigram’s initial context was 
part of an explanation of what to do if a sheep in one’s flock is struck by pestilence: “[C]heck the 
offence, ere the dread taint spreads through the unwary throng.”10 Whatever the motivation, 
Haygarth’s plans were never put into practice, in part due to his support of the French 
Revolution, an unpopular opinion to hold in Britain at the time. 
 
While contact tracing’s roots stretch back to smallpox (and even before, depending on one’s 
definition), it did not become a pervasive disease control strategy until it was used in the 
identification and notification of sexually transmitted infections in the 20th century. Tracing had 
already become linked with trust and stigma, and this relationship was further cemented by the 
sensitive and outwardly invisible nature of these diseases. 
 
In 1937, U.S. surgeon general Thomas Parran — who would later champion and approve 
unethical syphilis experiments in Guatemala and Tuskegee, Alabama11,12,13— created a five-
pronged approach to lower the rate of syphilis infections, which he said were costing the country 
at least $15 million a year in outpatient care.14 He called public efforts “scattered, sporadic, and 
inadequate.” He placed effective contact tracing and notification at the forefront of his plan, 
referencing its use against smallpox: 
 
“A physician would not consider treating a case of smallpox without investigating fully the 
source of infection. He would either undertake this himself or report to the health department to 
make the investigation. On the other hand, one does not feel any such responsibility in cases of 
early syphilis. Yet the tracing of the source of syphilis is no more difficult than tracing the source 
of smallpox and is just as important.”15 
 
Parran’s comparison elides a key difference between the two diseases, namely the degree to 
which syphilis was associated with sex (particularly with prostitutes) and thus stigmatized. 
Doctors at the time felt they had to walk a fine line between preserving confidentiality and 
protecting the “innocent” victims of the disease, mainly spouses and children.14 And at a time 
where moral laxity was blamed for an increase in syphilis cases, visiting a brothel was not 
looked upon kindly.16 
 
But Parran believed he could use stigma to his advantage: he coined a term to encourage public 
awareness of the sexually transmitted infection: “syphilophobia,” literally, the fear of syphilis.15 
While that fear-based approach did spread awareness about the disease, it also further 
stigmatized the disease and, indirectly, the contact tracers at the frontline of the public health 
effort to treat it. Ultimately, Parran’s plan was enacted, and in 1948, the federal government 
began training workers known as Public Health Advisers. The role entailed both contact tracing 
and basic phlebotomy, since syphilis patients were often loath to go into clinics to get tested.17 
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The association between prostitution and sexually transmitted infections reaches back before 
Parran’s time and stigmatized positive diagnoses. From the turn of the 16th century until the 19th 
century, prostitutes were regularly inspected in European cities through a regulatory process 
called reglementation.14 In the U.S., similar procedures were implemented by states and within 
industries. In one instance, the Minnesota Iron Company advised male employees to see a 
physician if they experienced symptoms of a sexually transmitted infection after seeing a 
prostitute, whereupon the doctor would take down the names of the brothel and women for 
further follow-up. Infected women were prevented from seeing clients — though this may have 
reduced the spread of certain diseases, it may have equally incentivized women to lie about their 
status or name, or push them further underground.14 
 
Concurrent to Parran’s reforms in the 20th century, contact tracing was employed as a strategy to 
combat rising rates of sexually transmitted infections like gonorrhea and syphilis not just in the 
States, but abroad as well.18 Tracers faced unique — and understudied — burdens. One of the 
few studies that explored the impact that contact tracing had on tracers themselves summarized 
the transference of stigma that these tracers, who were predominantly women, endured: 
“[W]orking as a contact tracer for venereal disease had a distinct impact on a tracer’s social life. 
Tracers ’lives were compromised by secrecy, stigma, morality and the demands of public health 
policy.”18 
 
Marsha*1 was a contact tracer for venereal diseases in New Zealand following World War II. 
Her role, according to an interview with her at the end of her life in 2002, “combined [that] of a 
public health nurse, a social worker and a kind of detective in one person. This role developed in 
an erratic fashion, it was uncoordinated and it existed under a cloud of secrecy.” Like 90% of 
New Zealand contact tracers at the time, Marsha did not have any formal education about STIs 
or public health. The information she received about contacts could be unhelpful: “She goes to 
the hotel at Friday nights and she drinks Southern Comforts” was an actual description of a 
person she was assigned to track down and notify for exposure to a sexually transmitted 
infection.18 
 
Marsha never married and described herself as somewhat of an outcast: “I sometimes wonder if I 
was chosen for the job because I was a loner or if it was the other way around,” she told the 
interviewer.18 
 
By the time of the AIDS epidemic, the approach to contact tracing depended both on the disease 
and the state one was in. Nationwide, there was a mix of provider referral and conditional 
referral — the latter referring to the practice of allowing either a clinician or the index case 
himself to contact potential exposures.14 As with the sexually transmitted infections that predated 
HIV, privacy was a priority for cases, and a determining factor in whether they’d cooperate with 
tracers. Laws criminalizing the disclosure of one’s HIV status added another risk to testing, 
disclosure, and cooperation.19 
 
 
1*A pseudonym from the original study that interviewed her. 
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One small study asked 25 HIV-positive women in New Jersey if they’d disclose sexual partners 
to a contact tracer: 68% said they would if their own identity were not revealed, but that 
percentage dropped to 20 if it were not confidential.20 
 
In New Zealand, as with worldwide, a change took place in the mid-1970s that rendered contact 
tracers like Marsha obsolete. As partner notification became folded into the jobs of clinics, it 
supplanted traditional tracing efforts. Instead of dedicated contact tracers, the role might be 
played by a clinician or support staff member.21 Full-time disease intervention specialists 
employed by health departments carried out contact tracing for a number of infections, but on a 
smaller scale.22 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, one official estimated that there were 
approximately 2,200 full-time contact tracers employed in the U.S., or one for every nearly 
150,000 American citizens.23 
 
1.2 Contact tracing during the COVID-19 pandemic 
 
You didn’t have any experience working in public health when you applied for a contact tracing 
position with your local health department. You learned the basics of case investigation and 
notification through a 14-hour online course, several of which have cropped up online since the 
start of the pandemic. Your department staggers 10-hour shifts throughout the week so that 
tracing is occurring around-the-clock. 
 
At the beginning of a day’s shift, you log onto a remote desktop and are assigned a name and 
phone number — someone who has recently tested positive for COVID-19. You call their 
number from a Google Voice phone number you’ve been instructed to use, so that you avoid 
phone fees and so cases and contacts won’t have your personal number. 
 
After verifying the case’s identity, you ask questions about their symptoms. Whether you say it 
or not, the reason you do this is to get a sense of their infectious period — how long they’ve 
potentially been spreading the disease to others. Once you’ve established that period, you work 
with the case to remember what they did and how many close contacts they might have had. You 
type these up, including their relation to the case (household, work, or social contact perhaps) 
and their phone number if the case provides it. 
 
Your next task is to work with the case to develop a plan for how they’ll stay isolated until 
they’re no longer infectious. Part of the job might mean defining exactly what isolating means, 
and troubleshooting any barriers to avoiding contacts, like childcare or workplace 
responsibilities. You can refer the person to food delivery services if they would otherwise go to 
a grocery store, for example.24 
 
At the bottom of your checklist, you also have a section labeled “Quick Reminders.” They 
include a list of symptoms requiring emergency care, a metric for calculating a case’s infectious 
period, and two subheaders with “phrases for building rapport” and “active listening techniques.” 
You’re advised to say things like “This is a difficult time” and “I hear you,” and to paraphrase 




Before you hang up, you make a plan to check in with the case to assess their symptoms, likely 
once a day.25 After the call, you ’ll write up a report and pass it along to contact notifiers, whose 
tasks are to reach out to every close contact based on the information provided to them. Or, 
depending on where you work and what policies they’ve decided on, you might serve double 
duty as both the investigator and the notifier. At least some of the contacts you call won’t pick 
up, and you or a colleague will try again the next day. Several nonanswers and you’ll mark the 
contact as a nonresponse and move on.  
 
After calling the case, you take a few minutes to collect yourself. Then it’s on to the next call, 
and the next one after that for the rest of your shift. Multiply that experience by tens of thousands 
each day, and you’ve got a picture of what contact tracing looks like in the U.S. 
 
Both hypothetical scenarios — the one in which you were called by a contact tracer, the other 
where you were the contact tracer — are based on a composite of CDC, media, and official 
training sources, but the realities of contact tracing are varied and hard to pin down. Because 
there is no national force of contact tracers in the U.S., and there have been no published studies 
looking at what contact tracers actually do, the contact tracing interview is a kind of black box.  
 
But probing what goes on beneath the formalized structure of an interview is critical to 
understanding how tracing might be improved, and comparing human tracers with automated 
tracing programs. Here’s what we do know about the state of contact tracing during the COVID-
19 pandemic in the U.S. 
 
First: the outcome of these phone calls, measured in the number of contacts disclosed and 
contacted. As defined by the CDC, a close contact is someone who was within 6 feet of an 
infected person for a total of 15 minutes or more starting from 48 hours before illness onset until 
the time the patient is isolated.5 The number of close contacts for a given positive case can vary 
significantly depending on factors like a person’s household, their risk-taking behaviors, or the 
level of lockdown of a particular region. Still, we know that for most people, the number of close 
contacts is much greater than one. In a study that used data from Singapore, a country with 
particularly intensive contact tracing and notification processes, a cohort of 1,114 people with 
lab-confirmed cases of SARS-CoV-2 listed 7,770 close contacts, or roughly seven contacts per 
person.26 Another study in Taiwan identified 2,761 close contacts from 100 cases.27 
 
How many contact tracers does a country like the U.S. need? 100,000 was an oft-cited number, 
taken from a report out of Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.28 To answer the 
question, the report factored in tracing efforts used in previous coronavirus outbreaks (SARS and 
MERS) and the particulars of how SARS-CoV-2 is spread. The 100,000 professionals they 
recommended would consist of a mix of health department staff, community members, already 
trained contact tracers, and social workers.29 
 
Without a starting infrastructure, such an investment was costly. Tracers earn on average 
$35,000 a year.23 Put another way, estimates of the cost of the 100,000 tracing force came to 
around $3.6 billion.30 That cost, of course, was not distributed evenly across states: New York 




Some argued that even that would not be enough to slow the spread of the virus before the 
development of vaccines. Using mathematical modeling, one study concluded that as two 
variables increased — the R0, or number of secondary infections stemming from a single 
primary case in a totally susceptible population, and the proportion of transmission events 
occurring before symptom onset — effective contact tracing became close to impossible.33   
 
These models of contact tracing, thus far, have assumed a semi-ideal world, in which people 
remember their close contacts from the previous days perfectly, and are transparent and honest in 
disclosing them. That, of course, is not always the case. 
 
It is difficult to ascertain just how often people lie or consciously omit when being interviewed 
by contact tracers. A study in the CDC publication Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report found 
that 35% of positive coronavirus cases interviewed by North Carolina contact tracers reported 0 
close contacts (those who did report contacts listed three, on average).34 At least a quarter of the 
contacts listed could not be reached. In New Jersey, half of cases reached refused to provide 
contacts.35 
 
Trust is an integral part of contact tracing, but it’s not always a given. Contact tracers during the 
pandemic faced hurdles in convincing Americans that they were who they said they were. It can 
be unnerving to pick up the phone and talk to a stranger who knows personal information about 
you, like your name, birthdate, and address. And in a year where scam calls are on the rise36, 
people are justified in being skeptical of calls from unknown numbers; in May, the Federal Trade 
Commission warned Americans about scammers impersonating tracers over text message.37  
 
Cooperation is a separate question entirely. A Pew survey from late October 2020 found that 
28% of U.S. adults polled would not share the names of close contacts with public health 
officials as part of a contact tracing program.38 
 
Distrust can come from a few places. Not only may cases worry about confidentiality, but by 
reporting contacts as also having attended large indoor gatherings, they may also feel like they 
are implicating those friends in bad behavior. 
 
“You would think if you might cause another person to become ill, you would have an interest in 
that person being notified. But some worry they are snitching on other people,” Marcus Plescia, 
the chief medical officer for the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, told Kaiser 
Health News.39 Those worries aren’t justified: public health officials technically have the 
authority to mandate quarantine, but they almost always choose gentle persuasion instead.40 
Additionally, while violating some states’ stay-at-home orders incurred fines, contact tracers are 
not the group enforcing those policies, and reporting a gathering that violates public health 
guidance to a contact tracer would not get a person in legal hot water. 
 
Marginalized communities may also be particularly fearful of talking to a contact tracer.41 
Undocumented immigrants may fear that interacting with public health officials may lead to their 
deportation — a problem that current-day contact tracers for tuberculosis have also 
encountered.42,43 Instructions and questions may be misinterpreted by people for whom English is 
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not their first language, and a contact tracing corps may not have enough translators to step in. 
And according to one survey, those facing social and economic hardships said they would be less 
likely to participate in testing programs including contact tracing than those not facing the same 
challenges.44 
 
Stigma and shame are driving factors in people’s reluctance to cooperate.45 One study found that 
people who lied about not having COVID-19 symptoms (34% of survey respondents) said they 
were afraid of stigma and social judgment.46 But the contact tracing call isn’t just stressful for the 
person on the receiving end of the line. Full-time tracers work in shifts to call positive cases — 
one contact tracing supervisor in California described how the process added up over the course 
of a shift: 
 
“If you look at the number of interviews that you have to call in a day and you figure out that 
each one … is about a 30-minute interview with a 15-minute prep, and then a 15-minute 
summary just to make sure the data is accurate. You've got really one heck of a day ahead of 
you. You're doing nothing but calling people and trying to convince them to do something they'd 
rather not do. They don't want to hear from you because it involves the illness …. It just doesn't 
let up.”24 
 
Surges in case numbers make the job even more overwhelming: the supervisor said that during a 
surge in the winter of 2020, he assigned 1,000 positive cases to a staff of five people in one 
night. 
 
Other times, tracers may be the first to tell a person about their positive diagnosis, or track 
outbreaks where one or more people have died from coronavirus infection.47  
 
“It’s emotionally devastating for them and for us,” said one Nevada contact tracer.48 Another 
tracer said he spent most of his nights after shifts ended “lying on the floor” of his home.48 
 
Some researchers believe contact tracers may be at risk for compassion fatigue, a type of stress 
that has been documented in the medical staff who work in Intensive Care Units.49  
 
At the same time, contact tracers have faced death threats and been the subject of conspiracy 
theories.50 According to a June 2020 report, YouTube videos with names like “Beware the 
Contact Tracers” had racked up over 300,000 views each and were being shared tens of 
thousands of times on Facebook before being removed by the platforms.51  
 
Even so, there are no formal protocols in place to support the emotional health of contact tracers. 
One tracing force organized a “pep rally” featuring a Zoom visit from NIAID director Anthony 
Fauci.49 Organizers of other forces said that being understaffed amid surges led to increased 
stress and burnout, but there’s been little research into interventions to help contact tracers cope 
with the emotional burden of their jobs.52 
 
When Haygarth was investigating epidemic smallpox in Chester, he relied on personal 
interviews and patient visits, along with reports from other local physicians. That’s not 
coincidental: it was common in the early days of contact tracing for the tracers to be medical 
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officers, health commissioners, or other health department workers.53 Since then, however, 
contact tracing corps have comprised fewer full-time medical professionals and a greater 
proportion of volunteers. This trend can be explained by the specialization of medicine and 
public health professions, as well as the erratic demand for dedicated contact tracing. 
 
The temporary nature of modern contact tracers raises an issue: namely, we don’t know who they 
are. No published studies have sought to figure out the demographic makeup of contact tracing 
teams, and we have no large-scale knowledge of their ages, races, occupations, genders; whether 
they are predominantly paid or volunteer; whether they work full- or part-time; whether they 
have a background in public health.  
 
It matters who contact tracers are because their make-up can influence who feels most at ease 
cooperating with them. It’s known, for instance, that LGBTQ-identified individuals have better 
health outcomes and are more forthcoming with LGBTQ providers.54 Contact tracing involves 
empathy, but also language and cultural competency. Knowing who contact tracers are could 
also aid organizers in developing large-scale programs to support them. The lack of such 
initiatives coupled with glaring gaps in information about contact tracers points to areas of 
research that, for whatever reason, have yet to be explored. 
 
Knowing little about contact tracers isn’t a new issue, either. The researcher who interviewed 
Marsha about contact tracing noted that her account was one of two that exist of New Zealand 
contact tracers from WWII and right after. We can look to newspaper articles for small-scale 
answers about who some contact tracers are, but they are in no way representative of this 
broader, unknown population. 
 
Still, we can surmise several things. First, it’s likely that contact tracers come from a range of 
backgrounds and levels of experience with public health. Said one Vermont contact tracer, “It’s 
like everybody, from the most entry level jobs in the Department of Health, up to the deputy 
commissioner level … have been in the ranks of contact tracers. I remember a moment when I 
was looking at the list of cases for the day, and it shows who is assigned to that investigation, 
seeing [Vermont deputy health commissioner] Tracy Dolan assigned to cases. It’s like, ‘Wow! 
Tracy Dolan’s doing the same job I am? How cool is that? ’I love the mix of professions and 
ages and stages of career that makes up the pool of contact tracers.”55 At another extreme, the 
director of UCSF’s contact tracing program said that a majority of his contact tracing workforce 
were librarians.49 
 
Measured through average turnaround times, response rate, and proportion of people who listed 
no contacts, contact tracing in the U.S. was an abject failure, much more so than in other 
countries.56 The U.S. never approached 100,000 contact tracers — as of August 2020, an NPR 
survey found the total was less than half that, or 41,122.57 At the time of the survey, nine states 
reported that case surges and testing delays forced them to adjust their contact tracing programs. 
In Nevada during August 2020, for example, a health investigator said that tracing was 
“impossible” due to the volume of cases and shortage of staff.58 Health officials made similar 
statements about Texas over the same period.59 Part of the problem was that though some states ’
tracing workforces were adequate, surges and lulls in cases produced pressure points around the 
nation that were not easy to predict. Leaving contact tracing up to state and regional health 
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departments made those workforces immobile and resistant to change — a Vermont tracer could 
not just switch to California, even if cases in Vermont were under control and those in California 
were surging, because a Vermont tracer works for Vermont’s health department, a completely 
separate entity from California’s. 
 
Traditional contact tracing during the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S. was hindered by design 
and execution. The variability of every conversation between a tracer and case or contact is 
variable by nature, which can help effective tracers build trust but makes the practice difficult to 
standardize or study. A major limitation to tracing has been its demand on time and manpower, 
not to mention cost. Speed is paramount in minimizing new infections spread by a case’s close 
contacts and their contacts, especially when there’s a significant proportion of asymptomatic 
infection. Technology for contact tracing and notification, not a novel concept but never used at 
this scale, arrived in the midst of this strained system. 
 
1.3 The role of contact tracing apps during the COVID-19 pandemic 
 
You test positive for COVID-19. But this time, instead of a person calling you up to ask about 
your close contacts, your phone does the job for them. The process is streamlined and automated. 
It takes only seconds from the time your positive test result is processed to notify your close 
contacts that they’ve been exposed to coronavirus and should quarantine. Here’s how it’s 
supposed to work.  
 
A positive test is reported to an app. If a case has already consented to having their cellular data 
shared with the app, it will calculate a period of infectiousness and triangulate their location at all 
times throughout that period. It does that in one of a few ways: you can get a general idea of a 
person’s location based on what cell phone towers their phone pings as it connects to the Internet 
or makes and takes calls; however, this method can be inaccurate.60 Instead, apps may take these 
location data from a few nearby cell towers. Another option is to make use of a phone’s GPS 
capabilities. Finally, an app may use Bluetooth beacons, which are fleeting connections created 
when two devices with Bluetooth capability are in proximity to one another. A particular flavor, 
called Bluetooth Low Energy, doesn’t drain a user’s battery as quickly and was seen as a more 
promising alternative to standard Bluetooth.17 
 
Outside the U.S., countries like Singapore and India developed their own technology tracing 
programs based on Bluetooth Low Energy and GPS tracking and in some cases mandated that 
citizen participate in them. In America, as in most countries, most technological tracing is based 
on the Google/Apple Exposure Notification system, or GAEN. The purpose of the GAEN system 
is to keep users ’personal information — i.e., fine-grain location data —private from public 
health personnel.61 Of course, there are exceptions to GAEN’s seeming ubiquity: North Dakota, 
South Dakota, and Wyoming, for example, adapted their exposure notification app, Care19 
Alert, from a preexisting Bluetooth-powered app used to track bison.62 
 
The technology companies that have created these apps say their role is to support traditional 
contact tracers.63 In some health departments and organizations where they’ve been used, apps 
have served as a way to double-check the information gleaned from a case interview. In others, it 
means leaving traditional case finding or exposure notification up to the apps, freeing up an 
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otherwise understaffed contact tracing workforce. Initial models appeared promising, concluding 
that even in the absence of widespread adoption, apps that could notify contacts immediately and 
skip an assumed 3–4 day delay of traditional contact notification would significantly reduce 
downstream infections.64 
 
Google and Apple anticipated that individual states would develop their own apps using their 
application programming interface (API), but only six states did.65 In early September 2020, they 
pivoted: Google designed custom apps for each state, while Apple offered states an app built into 
its operating system.66 The branding also changed: what Google and Apple first called “contact 
tracing” apps back in April 2020 became “exposure notification.” 
 
One of the drawbacks of traditional contact tracing was its cost — were exposure notification 
apps any cheaper? The limited data we have suggest that in the U.S. at least, the answer was no. 
New York state spent $700,000 on their GAEN-based app, and Virginia spent nearly $230,000.67 
The added costs didn’t seem to translate to increased adoption, either: as of December 2020, only 
5% of New York’s population downloaded the state-specific app.68 
 
Touted as an alternative to human error, Bluetooth Low Energy tracking isn’t actually foolproof. 
One’s signal gains and loses strength depending on where they are — in an open field, in a 
crowded city, or underground, perhaps.69 Depending on how one encodes a threshold over which 
two signals are considered to be “close contact,” the apps may read out results that vary in 
accuracy and precision. Bluetooth signals can travel through walls, for example.70 One study 
found that when tested on a commuter tram, Swiss and German thresholds triggered 0 close 
contact notifications, while Italian rule generated 50% false positives.71 A GAEN-based system 
also has the potential to be spammed by repeating the ID code of a true positive over a wider 
area to deliberately create false positives.72 
 
Contact tracing apps’ access to and use of personal data were a concern for many, given that they 
were used in countries such as Russia and China to surveil citizens, in some cases 
involuntarily.73 GAEN systems purposely decentralized and encrypted user information into 
unique, anonymous strings of numbers.70 It is surprisingly easy to identify a person based on 
their location data, and there are ways, albeit involved, to reverse engineer GAEN identifiers and 
deanonymize data.74 Some state’s apps that have used the GAEN platform also ask for optional 
demographic information; a user’s answers to these questions undermines the anonymity of the 
system by making it possible for state officials who have access to the data to draw inferences 
about individuals.75 Not only that, metadata generated by apps built on a GAEN platform could 
unintentionally reveal a user’s IP address. 
 
The drawbacks explored so far highlight problems with the apps when they are used — since no 
one must download any of the apps, adoption is a problem in and of itself.23 Modeling studies 
suggested that up to 80% of all smartphone users would have to opt in to an app for it to be 
effective at ending the pandemic.76 While other studies found that lower adoption rates would 
still decrease case rates, it’s mathematically intuitive that only a fraction of exposures would be 
notified. After all, if only 15% of users download an app, the chance that two people who have 
both downloaded the app will encounter one another is even lower.77 
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Furthermore, apps built on a GAEN platform exclude people who do not own smartphones — 
around 17% of North Americans.78 People who have smartphones (and reliable internet and cell 
service) and are digital natives are more likely to be younger, whiter, and richer.79 
 
In the same Pew survey in which the majority of U.S. adults asked said they would cooperate 
with contact tracers, only 49% said they would feel comfortable sharing cellphone location data 
with a public health official for contact tracing.38 
 
Outcomes for tracing apps have been preliminary and mixed. A non-peer reviewed evaluation of 
Britain’s GAEN-based exposure notification app found that those who opted-in to it starting in 
September 2020 were less likely than those contacted by traditional tracers and notifiers to 
eventually test positive for SARS-CoV-2.80 The difference, they concluded, prevented over 
200,000 cases of coronavirus, perhaps due to reaching out to contacts sooner than traditional 
tracers would have. However, in a review that looked at all published instances of manual and 
automated contact tracing between 2000 and April 2020, researchers found no evidence that 
automated contact tracing was effective.81 
 
In the U.S., little research has been published on the effectiveness of exposure notification apps. 
Instead, studies have focused on more basic metrics, like usability and participation rate, before 
tackling the question of efficacy. One small study measured adoption of a GAEN-based app at 
the University of Arizona. The study, which was published as a preprint, found that less than half 
of people who tested positive for coronavirus and were interviewed by university contact tracers 
used the app; however, among those who used it, over half reported their positive diagnosis to it 
prior to their case interview.82 Searching for research about digital contact tracing apps in two 
popular directories for peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed literature yielded no other results 
for trials in the U.S., but media reports have largely characterized the apps as not living up to 
their promise. 
 
1.4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
Contact tracing for infectious diseases began long before the COVID-19 pandemic, but its 
implementation at a never-before-seen scale and efforts to automate the process through 
technology has made for a novel field of study, full of potential and pitfalls.  
 
There is so much we do not know, from who contact tracers are to a systematic way of seeing 
what it is they do. It is inevitable that with time, more empirical studies will be published that 
assess the impacts of human and automatic contact tracing, comparing outcomes in the U.S. with 
those of other countries. 
 
But right now, we can conclude that traditional contact tracing was not set up to succeed in the 
U.S., from historical links to stigma and shame to the lack of resources with which tracing 
organizations had to make do. The promise of exposure notification apps — to relieve human 
tracers of some of the burden in a fast, cost-effective way — proved neither cost-effective nor 




Mary Gray, a social scientist at Microsoft Research, summarized the main issue with apps this 
way: “technology can’t solve the problem of convincing someone they should pick up the phone 
when a contact tracer calls….It is the reason we are failing—because we keep searching for 
something else we can buy or put into place. We have not conceded how deeply human this 
process is.”42 
 
The problem with automated exposure notification apps is that they remove the human element 
from tracing.83 Traditional contact tracing encompasses much more than building a list of 
exposures and relaying a message to them. Rather, it emphasizes listening and identifying 
barriers to care and cooperation, which apps cannot replicate. 
 
Some researchers feel that the way contact tracing apps have been conceptualized is all wrong. 
Instead of using them for individual-level notification, GAEN platforms could alert public health 
officials to superspreader locations, or give insight into demographics and networks at risk.84 
 
Aside from its shortcomings, contact tracing apps forced the reevaluation of what contact tracing 
is for and brought the practice into the vernacular. As the outcomes of contact tracing during the 
COVID-19 pandemic are investigated and published, this reevaluation is bound to continue. The 
story of contact tracing is still being written. 
 
1.5 Supporting materials for a special project thesis 
 
My reasons for attending public health school were always to use the master’s degree to inform 
my reporting on science and public health. To that end, I was most concerned with creating a 
thesis that I could in some way apply to a future reporting project, and less concerned with 
publishing my thesis as a scientific paper in a peer-reviewed journal. I decided that a longform 
journalism article would be most suited to my strengths, and most useful to my professional 
aspirations. I hope to eventually publish this thesis in a popular science outlet as a feature — 
having accrued bylines in CNN, Vice, Popular Science, Inverse, and other outlets, I believe this 
to be a reasonable and achievable goal. I have already soft-pitched this story to editors at 
Scientific American, where I will be working this summer, and they have expressed interest in 
seeing the final product. My target audience with this article, therefore, is not public health 
professionals, scientists, or researchers, but rather general members of the public without a recent 
science background or STEM education beyond high school.  
A key reason that I chose this format for the presentation of my master’s thesis is the severe lack 
of published, peer-reviewed literature when it comes to contact tracing. I go into this in the thesis 
itself, but the majority of written work about who contact tracers are and what they do comes 
from the realm of media reports and personal narratives — in other words, grey literature. One of 
my goals was to synthesize the dozens of narratives I’ve read while researching this thesis and 
attempt to generalize the experiences of contact tracers in a way that revealed information about 
their jobs and outcomes, and pointed to areas for future research. 
Based on the subject matter and my knowledge of print and digital media, I decided to research 
and write a longform journalism article. These articles are typically between 4,000 and 10,000 
words and contain a mix of reporting, research, and analysis. One of the key differences between 
analytic and academic writing is journalism’s reliance on a writer’s voice and point of view — 
there are points throughout this thesis that I write in my own voice, from my own opinion. I use 
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studies and sources, but it is important to note that uncited statements are typical of this form of 
writing, by intent a mixture of op-ed and reportage. 
Based on the format for this product, I imagine it is quite different from literature reviews or 
original research theses typically graded; instead, it combines aspects of historical research, 
literature review, analysis, and opinion writing. As a Yale undergraduate, I enrolled in several 
science writing courses. Here is a rubric taken from “Writing about Science & the Environment,” 
an upper-level seminar taught by New York Times science journalist Carl Zimmer: 
“A (95)= For a story that could appear in a publication with minor rewriting. 
B (85)= For a story that has a strong core (good reporting, presents a clear idea of what it’s 
about, and so on) but requires some significant revising before being published 
C (75)= A story in serious need of work on all aspects: reporting, organization, attention to 
language, etc., before it could even be considered for publication 
D (65)= A story that is poorly reported and unacceptably written.” 
I understand that a grader who is not an editor at a newspaper or magazine may find this grading 
scheme difficult to replicate, but it the metric by which I judge this thesis. I looked through the 
syllabi of three other science writing classes I took while at Yale and failed to find any other sort 
of rubric. I believe this speaks to a wider principle that professors generally grade papers without 
a formal rubric. I am happy to have this thesis assessed on that scale. 
Because of the audience for this project, I was unable to go into technical detail in the same way 
as a traditional thesis would have. The studies cited are also not a comprehensive review of all 
literature on contact tracing, but rather a synthesis of the body of research on contact tracing in 
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